In this paper we give a natural deduction formulation of hybrid logic. Our natural deduction system can be extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction systems in a uniform way for a wide class of hybrid logics which appears to be impossible in the context of ordinary modal logic. We prove soundness and completeness and we prove a normalization theorem. We finally prove a result which says that normal derivations in the natural deduction system correspond to derivations in a cut-free Gentzen system.
Introduction
In this paper we give a natural deduction formulation of hybrid logic. Hybrid logic is obtained by adding to ordinary multi-modal logic further expressive power in the form of a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals, and moreover, by adding so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal is assumed to be true at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. Thus, in hybrid logic a name is a particular sort of propositional symbol whereas in first-order logic it is an argument to a predicate. If is a nominal and is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula called a satisfaction statement can be formed. The part of is called a satisfaction operator. The satisfaction statement expresses that the formula is true at one particular world, namely the world at which the nominal is true. Furthermore, we shall consider the so-called binders and . The binders bind nominals to worlds in two different ways: the binder quantifies over worlds whereas binds a nominal to the actual world. The binder is definable in terms of .
The history of hybrid logic goes back to Arthur Prior's work, more precisely, it goes back to what he called four grades of tense-logical involvement. They were presented in the book [22] , Chapter XI (also Chapter XI in the new edition [17] ). See also [21] Chapter V.6 and Appendix B.3-4. The stages progress from what can be regarded as pure first-order earlier-later logic to what can be regarded as pure tense logic; the goal being to be able to consider the tense logic of the fourth stage as encompassing the earlier-later logic of the first stage. In other words, the goal was to be able to translate the first-order logic of the earlier-later relation into tense logic. With this in mind, Prior introduced so-called instant-propositions:
What I shall call the third grade of tense-logical involvement consists in treating the instantvariables , , , etc. as also representing propositions ( [22] , p. 122-123).
In the context of modal logic, Prior called such propositions possible-world-propositions. Of course, this is what we in this paper call nominals. Prior also introduced the binder and what we here call satisfaction operators. See [18] for an account of Prior's work. The paper [8] makes a connection to Donald Davidson's notion of a theory of truth. Natural deduction style inference rules for ordinary classical first-order logic were originally introduced by Gerhard Gentzen in [16] and later on considered by Dag Prawitz in [19, 20] . See [26] for a general introduction to natural deduction systems. In this paper we shall give natural deduction systems for various fragments of hybrid logic, namely the fragments of hybrid logic corresponding to each subset of the set of binders and we shall prove that the systems are sound and complete. Moreover, we shall show how to extend the natural deduction systems with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessibility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric theories. Different geometric theories give rise to different hybrid logics, so natural deduction systems for new hybrid logics can be obtained in a uniform way simply by adding inference rules as appropriate.
Natural deduction systems are characterized by having two different kinds of rules for each nonnullary connective; there is a kind of rule which introduces a connective (thus, the connective occurs in the conclusion, but not in the premisses) and there is a kind of rule which eliminates a connective (vice versa). A maximum formula in a derivation is then a formula occurrence which is both introduced by an introduction rule and eliminated by an elimination rule. Such a maximum formula can be considered a 'detour' in the derivation. Maximum formulas can be removed by using what is called proper reductions. Another kind of reduction, permutative reduction, is used to remove so-called permutable formulas. In our natural deduction systems, permutable formulas only occur in connection with the additional inference rules corresponding to geometric theories. A derivation is called normal if it contains no maximum or permutable formula and we prove a normalization theorem which says that any derivation can be rewritten to such a normal derivation by repeated applications of reductions. Normal derivations satisfiy a version of the subformula property called the quasi-subformula property.
The present paper is a revised and extended version of [7] which gave only a partial normalization theorem saying that any maximum or permutable formula can be removed provided it is not of the form ¦ . The problem not dealt with in [7] is that the removal of a maximum formula of that form in some cases generates new maximum formulas of the same form and the technique used in the standard normalization proof does not work in such cases since it requires that the generated maximum formulas all have a lower degree, that is, fewer connectives, than the original one. In the present paper this problem is solved by using the so-called £-graph of a derivation, which to the best of our knowledge is a novel notion.
Usually, when a modal natural deduction system is given, it is for one particuler modal logic.
For example, Prawitz in [19] gives natural deduction systems for the modal logics Ë and Ë . It has turned out to be difficult to formulate natural deduction systems for modal logics in a uniform way without introducing metalinguistic machinery. With reference to Prawitz's systems for Ë and Ë , Robert Bull and Krister Segerberg note the following in their survey paper on modal logic in
Handbook of Philosophical Logic.
However, it has proved difficult to extend this sort of analysis to the great multitude of other systems of modal logic. It seems fair to say that a deductive treatment congenial to modal logic is yet to be found, for Hilbert systems are not suited for actual deduction, . . . ( [13] , p.
27-28)
So what is it that enables us to formulate uniform natural deduction rules for a wide class of hybrid logics when it appears to be impossible in the context of ordinary modal logic? Three features of hybrid logic appear to be crucial: we can express that We finish the paper by setting our natural deduction system to work: we use our normalization theorem to prove result which says that normal derivations in the natural deduction system correspond to derivations in a cut-free Gentzen 1 system. This implies the completeness of the Gentzen system. This paper is structured as follows. In the second section we recapitulate the basics of hybrid logic, in the third section we introduce our natural deduction systems, and in the fourth section we prove soundness and completeness. The fifth section is concerned with normalization and the sixth section is concerned with Gentzen systems corresponding to our natural deduction systems. In the final section we discuss some related work. A natural deduction system for first-order hybrid logic is given in the companion paper [10] . See also [9] where a functional completeness result is given for hybridized Ë which is a hybrid-logical version of Ë .
Hybrid logic
In this section we recapitulate the basics of hybrid logic. We shall in many cases adopt the terminology of [4] and [1] . The hybrid logic we consider is obtained by adding a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals to ordinary multi-modal logic, that is, propositional logic extended with a finite number of modal operators £ ½ , . . . , £ Ñ . It is assumed that a set of ordinary propositional symbols and a countably infinite set of nominals are given. The sets are assumed to be disjoint.
The metavariables Ô, Õ, Ö, . . . range over ordinary propositional symbols and , , , . . . range over nominals.
Beside nominals, two so-called binders, and , and for each nominal , an operator called a satisfaction operator are added. The formulas of hybrid modal logic are defined by the grammar
where Ô is an ordinary propositional symbol and is a nominal. In what follows, the metavariables , , , . . . range over formulas. Negation, nullary conjunction, and disjunction are defined by the conventions that is an abbreviation for , is an abbreviation for , and is an abbreviation for ´ µ. Similarly, ¦ is an abbreviation for £ and is an abbreviation for . It is assumed that we are working with a fixed number of modalities.
We now define frames and models. A frame is a tuple´Ï Ê ½ Ê Ñ µ where Ï is a nonempty set and Ê ½ , . . . , Ê Ñ are binary relations on Ï . 
Hybrid logic and first-order logic
It is a well-known observation that a model for hybrid logic can be considered a model for firstorder logic and vice versa. The first-order language under consideration has a ½-place predicate symbol for each ordinary propositional symbol of modal logic, a ¾-place predicate symbol for each modality, and a ¾-place predicate symbol for equality. The language does not have constant or function symbols. The metavariables , , , . . . range over first-order variables. So the formulas of the first-order language we consider are defined by the grammar
where Ô is an ordinary propositional symbol of hybrid logic, and and are first-order variables.
Note that the set of metavariables ranging over first-order variables is identical to the set of metavariables ranging over nominals. The connectives , , , and are defined in one of the usual ways. Free and bound variables are defined as usual. Also, if nominals of hybrid logic are identified with first-order variables, then an assignment in the sense of hybrid logic can be considered an assignment in the sense of first-order logic and vice versa. Given a model Å, considered a model for first-order logic, the relation Å is defined by induction, cf. standard first-order logic, where is an assignment and is a first-order formula. The formula is said to be true if Å ; otherwise it is said to be false. By convention Å means Å for every assignment . The observation that models and assignments for hybrid logic correspond to models and assignments for first-order logic gives rise to another observation, namely that the hybrid logic À´ µ and first-order logic have the same expressive power in the sense that there exist truth-preserving translations in both directions. The following is a truth-preserving translation from first-order logic to the hybrid logic À´ µ.
The history of the above mentioned observations goes back to the work of Arthur Prior, see for example [22] , Chapter XI. Similarly, the hybrid logic À´ µ has the same expressive power as the so-called bounded fragment of first-order logic. This was pointed out in [1] .
Natural deduction for hybrid logic
In this section a natural deduction system for the hybrid logic À´Çµ is given, and moreover, we show how to extend the system with additional rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations. Our natural deduction system shares several features with the tableau and Gentzen systems given in [3] , see the final section of the present paper for a detailed comparison. Before giving the natural deduction system, we shall sketch the basics of natural deduction. See [19] and [26] for further details.
A characteristic feature of natural deduction is that derivations have the form of trees. Formula occurrences at the leaves of a tree are called assumptions and the formula occurrence at the root of the tree is called the end-formula. All assumptions are annotated with numbers. An assumption is either undischarged or discharged. If an assumption is discharged, then it is discharged at a specified rule-instance which is indicated by annotating the assumption and the rule-instance with identical numbers. We shall often omit this information when no confusion can occur. A ruleinstance annotated with some number discharges all undischarged assumptions that are above it and are annotated with the number in question, and moreover, are occurrences of a specified formula. Two assumptions in a derivation belong to the same parcel if they are annotated with the same number and are occurrences of the same formula, and moreover, either are both undischarged or have both been discharged at the same rule-instance. Thus, in this terminology rules discharge parcels. We shall make use of the standard notation
which from left to right means: (i) a derivation where is the end-formula and Ö is the parcel consisting of all undischarged assumptions that have the form Ö ; (ii) a derivation where is the end-formula and´ Ö µ is a single undischarged assumption of the form Ö ; and (iii) a derivation where is the end-formula and a derivation with end-formula has been substituted for all the undischarged assumptions indicated by either Ö or´ Ö µ. A derivation in a natural deduction system is generated from a set of inference rules from derivations consisting of a single undischarged assumption.
£ is a propositional symbol (ordinary or a nominal).
does not occur free in £ or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of ¦ .
Ý does not occur free in or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of .
Þ does not occur free in or in any undischarged assumptions. 
FIGURE 2. Natural deduction rules for nominals
Another characteristic feature of natural deduction is that there are two different kinds of rules for each non-nullary connective; there is a kind of rule called introduction rule which introduces a connective (that is, the connective occurs in the conclusion of the rule, but not in the premisses) and there is a kind of rule called elimination rule which eliminates a connective (the connective occurs in the premiss of the rule, but not in the conclusion). Introduction rules traditionally have names of the form´ Á µ, and similarly, elimination rules traditionally have names of the form´
We shall make use of the following conventions. The metavariables , , . . . range over derivations. Formulas of the form are called satisfaction statements, cf. a similar notion in [3] . The metavariables , ¡, . . . range over sets of satisfaction statements. A derivation is a derivation of if the end-formula of is an occurrence of and is a derivation from if each undischarged assumption in is an occurrence of a formula in (note that numbers annotating undischarged assumptions are ignored). If there exists a derivation of from , then we simply say that is derivable. Moreover, is the derivation where each formula occurrence has been replaced by . Now, natural deduction inference rules for hybrid logic are given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . All formulas in the rules are satisfaction statements. Note that the rules´ ½µ and´ ¾µ are neither introduction rules nor elimination rules (recall that is an abbreviation for ). Our natural deduction system for À´Çµ is obtained from the rules given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 by leaving out the rules for the binders that are not in the set Ç (recall that Ç ). The system thus obtained will be denoted AE À´Çµ . So for example AE À´ µ is obtained by leaving out the rules´ Áµ and´ µ.
Below is an example of a derivation in AE À´µ .
The end-formula of the derivation is the axiom Bridge given in [1] prefixed by a satisfaction operator.
The natural deduction system AE À´Çµ corresponds to the class of all frames, that is, the class of frames where no conditions are imposed on the accessibility conditions. Hence, it is a hybrid version of the standard modal logic Ã. 
Conditions on the accessibility relations
In what follows we shall consider natural deduction systems obtained by extending AE À´Çµ with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessibility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric theories. A first-order formula is geometric if it is built out of atomic formulas of the forms Ê ´ µ and using only the connectives , , , and . In what follows, the metavariables Ë and Ë range over atomic first-order formulas of the forms Ê ´ µ and . See [28] for an introduction to geometric logic. Now, a geometric theory is a finite set of closed first-order formulas each having the form ´ µ where the formulas and are geometric, is a list ½ Ð of variables, and is an abbreviation for ½ Ð . It can be proved, cf. [25] , that any geometric theory is equivalent to a basic geometric theory, which is a geometric theory in which each formula has the form
where Ò Ñ ¼ and Ò ½ Ò Ñ ½. For simplicity, we assume that the variables in the list are pairwise distinct, that the variables in are pairwise distinct, and that no variable occurs in both and . A sample of formulas of the form displayed above is given in Figure 4 . Note that such a formula is a Horn clause if is empty, Ñ ½ , and Ò Ñ ½ . Thus, the first two formulas in Figure 4 are Horn clauses. Also, note that the third formula in Figure 4 is identical to
In what follows, the metavariables × and × range over hybrid-logical formulas of the forms ¦ and . It turns out that basic geometric theories correspond to straightforward natural deduction rules for hybrid logic: with a formula of the form displayed above, we associate the natural deduction rule´Ê µ given in Figure 3 where × is of the form À ÌË µ and × is of the form À ÌË µ (À Ì is the translation from first-order logic to hybrid logic given in the previous section).
If ½ , . . . , are formulas of the forms given in Figure 4 , then the associated natural deduction rules´Ê ½ µ, . . . ,´Ê µ are the rules in Figure 5 . Note that the rule´Ê ¿ µ has zero non-relational premisses. Now, let Ì be any basic geometric theory. The natural deduction system obtained by extending AE À´Çµ with the set of rules ´Ê µ ¾ Ì will be denoted AE À´Çµ · Ì. We shall assume that we are working with a fixed basic geometric theory Ì unless other is specified.
It is straightforward to check that if a formula of the form displayed above is a Horn clause, then the rule´Ê µ given in Figure 3 can be replaced by the simpler rule below (which we also have called
Natural deduction rules corresponding to Horn clauses were discussed in [20] .
Some eliminable rules
Below we shall prove a small proposition regarding some eliminable rules. To this end we need a convention: The degree of a formula is the number of occurrences of non-nullary connectives in it. PROOF. The proof that´ µ is eliminable is along the lines of a similar proof for ordinary classical first-order logic given in [19] . The proof that´AEÓÑµ is eliminable is analogous.
Note in the proposition above that can be any formula; not just a propositional symbol. Thus, the rule´ µ generalizes the rule´ ½µ whereas´AEÓÑµ generalizes´AEÓÑ½µ (and the rule´AEÓÑ¾µ as well). The side-conditions on the rules´ ½µ and´AEÓÑ½µ enable us to prove a normalization theorem such that normal derivations satisfy a version of the subformula property called the quasisubformula property. We shall return to this issue later.
Soundness and completeness
The aim of this section is to prove soundness and completeness. We shall need the standard substitution lemma below. In what follows, we shall prove completeness. The proof we give is similar to the completeness proof in [3] . However, we use maximal consistent sets instead of Hintikka sets. Also, our proof is in some ways similar to the completeness proof in [2] . Given a nominal , we let denote the equivalence class of with respect to ¡ . We now define a canonical model. Note that the first property of ¡ mentioned in Lemma 4.6 implies that Ê ¡ is well-defined, and similarly, the second property implies that Î ¡ is well-defined. Given the Lindenbaum lemma and the definition of a canonical model, we just need one small lemma before we are ready to prove a truth lemma. The treatment of in the lemma above is similar to the treatment of the binder in the truth lemma of [6] . We now just need one lemma before we can prove completeness. Now the completeness theorem.
If

THEOREM 4.11 (Completeness)
The second statement below implies the first statement.
1. is derivable from in AE À´Çµ · Ì. 
Normalization
In this section we give reduction rules for the natural deduction system AE À´Çµ · Ì and we prove a normalization theorem. First some conventions. If a premiss of a rule has the form or ¦ , then it is called a relational premiss, and similarly, if the conclusion of a rule has the form or ¦ , then it is called a relational conclusion. Moreover, if an assumption discharged by a rule has the form or ¦ , then it is called a relationally discharged assumption. The premiss of the form in the rule´ µ is called minor. A premiss of an elimination rule that is neither minor nor relational is called major. Note that the notion of a relational premiss is defined in terms of rules; not rule-instances. A similar remark applies to the other notions above. Thus, a formula occurrence in a derivation might be of the form ¦ and also be the major premiss of an instance of´ µ. Note that the premisses × ½ , . . . , × Ò in a´Ê µ rule are relational and that all the assumptions discharged by such a rule are relationally discharged.
A maximum formula in a derivation is a formula occurrence that is both the conclusion of an introduction rule and the major premiss of an elimination rule. Maximum formulas can be removed by applying proper reductions. The rules for proper reductions are as follows. We consider each case in turn.
Áµ followed by´ ½µ (analogously in the case involving´ ¾µ)
We also need reduction rules in connection with the´Ê µ inference rules. A permutable formula in a derivation is a formula occurrence that is both the conclusion of a´Ê µ rule and the major premiss of an elimination rule. Permutable formulas in a derivation can be removed by applying permutative reductions. The rule for permutative reductions is as follows in the case where the elimination rule has two premisses.
The nominals in the list are pairwise distinct and new. Note that the side-condition on the ruleś Ê µ, cf. Figure 3 , ensures that the formula is identical to . This remark also applies to the undischarged assumptions in the derivations of . The case where the elimination rule has only one premiss is obtained by deleting all instances of the derivation from the reduction rule above.
A derivation is normal if it contains no maximum or permutable formula. In what follows we shall prove a normalization theorem which says that any derivation can be rewritten to a normal derivation by repeated applications of reductions. To this end we need a number of definitions and lemmas. DEFINITION 5.1 Let Ð ¾ ½ Ñ . The £ Ð -graph of a derivation is the binary relation on the set of formula occurrences of , which is defined as follows. A pair of formula occurrences´ µ is an element of the £ Ð -graph of if and only if it satisfies one of the following conditions.
is of the form
£ Ð , is of the form ¦ Ð , and is either the major premiss of an instance of´£ Ð µ which has as the relational premiss or is the minor premiss of an instance of´ µ which has as the major premiss. 2. is of the form ¦ Ð , is of the form £ Ð , and is either an assumption discharged at an instance of´£ Ð Áµ which has as the conclusion or is the conclusion of an instance of Áµ at which is discharged. 
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Note that the notion of potential in the definition above is well-defined since Lemma 5.2 implies that the set of lengths of chains in the £ Ð -graph of is bounded.
LEMMA 5.4
Let be a derivation where all £ Ð -stubborn formulas have potential less than or equal to . Assume that is a £ Ð -stubborn formula with potential such that no formula occurrence above a minor or relational premiss of the rule instance of which is major premiss is £ Ð -stubborn and with potential . Let ¼ be the derivation obtained by applying the appropriate reduction such that is removed.
Then all £ Ð -stubborn formulas in ¼ have potential less than or equal to , and moreover, the number of £ Ð -stubborn formulas with potential in ¼ is less than the the number of £ Ð -stubborn formulas with potential in .
PROOF. There are four cases to check: if is a maximum formula, then it is either the conclusion of a´£ Ð Áµ rule and the major premiss of a´£ Ð µ rule or it is the conclusion of a´ Áµ rule and the major premiss of a´ µ rule. If is a permutable formula, then it is the conclusion of a´Ê µ rule and the major premiss of either a´£ Ð µ rule or a´ We are now ready to prove the normalization theorem. PROOF. The first step of the theorem is to prove that any derivation can be rewritten to a derivation in which each maximum or permutable formula is stubborn. This is done using a variation of a standard technique (originally given in [19] ).
The second step of the theorem is to prove that any derivation which is the result of the first step can be rewritten to a derivation in which all maximum or permutable formulas are of the form (thus, all stubborn formulas have been removed). To any derivation in which each non-stubborn maximum or permutable formula is of the form , we assign the pair´ µ of non-negative integers where is the maximal potential of a £ ½ -stubborn formula in or ¼ if there is no such formula occurrence and is the number of £ ½ -stubborn formulas in with potential . The proof is by induction on such pairs equipped with the lexicographic order. Let be a derivation to which a pair´ µ is assigned such that ¼. It is straightforward that there exists a £ ½ -stubborn formula with potential such that no formula occurrence above a minor or relational premiss of the rule instance of which is major premiss is £ ½ -stubborn and with potential . (Consider an arbitrary formula occurrence in the set of £ ½ -stubborn formulas with potential . We are done if satisfies the mentioned criteria. Otherwise, consider instead a £ ½ -stubborn formula with potential such that it is above a minor or relational premiss of the rule instance of which is major premiss. This step is repeated until a formula occurrence is found that satisfies the mentioned criteria.) Let ¼ be the derivation obtained by applying the appropriate reduction such that is removed. Then by inspecting the reduction rules it is trivial to check that each maximum or permutable formula in ¼ either is of the form or is stubborn, and moreover, by Lemma 5.4 the pair´ ¼ ¼ µ assigned to ¼ is less than´ µ in the lexicographic order. Thus, by induction we obtain a derivation in which each maximum or permutable formula either is of the form or for some Ð ¾ ¾ Ñ is £ Ð -stubborn. The second step is carried out Ñ times in total whereby a derivation in which each maximum or permutable formula is of the form is obtained. The third step of the theorem is to prove that any derivation which is the result of the second step can be rewritten to a normal derivation. This is done using the standard technique mentioned in the first step of the theorem.
Note that our notion of normalization involves permutative reductions, which is unusual for a classical natural deduction system. Intuitionistic systems, on the other hand, generally involve permutative reductions in connection with inference rules for the connectives , , and .
The form of normal derivations
Below we shall adapt an important definition from [19] to hybrid logic. 2. ½ is an assumption, or a relational conclusion, or the conclusion af a´Ê µ rule with zero nonrelational premisses.
3. Ò is either the end-formula of or a minor or relational premiss.
For each
Ò , is not a minor or relational premiss.
Note that ½ in the definition above might be a discharged assumption.
LEMMA 5.7 Any formula occurrence in a derivation belongs to some branch in .
PROOF. Induction on the structure of .
The definition of a branch leads us to the lemma below which says that a branch in a normal derivation can be split up into three parts: an analytical part in which formulas are broken down in their components by successive applications of the elimination rules, a minimum part in which an instance of the rule´ ½µ may occur, and a synthetical part in which formulas are put together by by successive applications of the introduction rules. See [20] .
LEMMA 5.8
Let ¬ ½ Ò be a branch in a normal derivation. Then there exists a formula occurrence in ¬, called the minimum formula in ¬, such that 1. for each , is the major premiss of an elimination rule, or the non-relational premiss of an instance of´AEÓÑ½µ, or the premiss of an instance of the rule´ ¾µ, or a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule; 2. if Ò, then is a premiss of an introduction rule or the premiss of an instance of the rulé ½µ; and 3. for each , where Ò , is a premiss of an introduction rule, or the non-relational premiss of an instance of´AEÓÑ½µ, or a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule.
PROOF. Let be the first formula occurrence in ¬ which is not the major premiss of an elimination rule, and is not the non-relational premiss of an instance of´AEÓÑ½µ, and is not the premiss of an instance of the rule´ ¾µ, and is not a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule (such a formula occurrence exists in ¬ as Ò satisfies the mentioned criterias). We are done if
Ò.
Otherwise is a premiss of an introduction rule or the premiss of an instance of the rule´ ½µ (by inspection of the rules and the definition of a branch). If is the premiss of an instance of the rulé ½µ, then ·½ has the form where is a propositional symbol. Therefore each , where Ò, is a premiss of an introduction rule, or the non-relational premiss of an instance of AEÓÑ½µ, or a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule (by inspection of the rules, the definition of a branch, and normality of ). Similarly, if is a premiss of an introduction rule, then each , where Ò, is a premiss of an introduction rule or a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule.
The lemma above is more technically involved than the corresponding result in [19] , the reason being the disturbing effect of´AEÓÑ½µ,´ ¾µ, and the´Ê µ rules. In the theorem below we make use of the following definition.
DEFINITION 5.9
The notion af a subformula is defined by the conventions that is a subformula of ; if or is a subformula of , then so are and ; if or £ is a subformula of , then so is ; and if or is a subformula of , then so is .
A formula is a quasi-subformula of a formula if and only if is a subformula of .
Now the theorem which says that normal derivations satisfy a version of the subformula property.
THEOREM 5.10 (Quasi-subformula property)
Let be a normal derivation of from in AE À´Çµ · Ì. Moreover, let be a formula occurrence in such that 1. is not an assumption discharged by an instance of the rule´ ½µ where the discharged assumption is the major premiss of an instance of´ µ;
2. is not an occurrence of in a branch whose first formula is an assumption discharged by an instance of the rule´ ½µ where the discharged assumption is the major premiss of an instance of´ µ; and 3. is not an occurrence of in a branch whose first formula is the conclusion of a´Ê µ rule with zero non-relational premisses.
Then is a quasi-subformula of , or of some formula in , or of some relational premiss, or of some relational conclusion, or of some relationally discharged assumption.
PROOF. First a small convention: the order of a branch in is the number of formula occurrences in which stand below the last formula occurrence of the branch. Now consider a branch ¬ ½ Ò in of order Ô. By induction we can assume that the theorem holds for all formula occurrences in branches of order less than Ô. Note that it follows from Lemma 5.8 that any formula occurrence such that , where minimum formula in ¬, is a quasi-subformula of ½ , and similarly, any such that is a quasi-subformula of Ò . We first consider Ò . We are done if Ò is the end-formula or a relational premiss. Otherwise Ò is the minor premiss of an instance of´ µ. If the major premiss of this instance of´ µ is not an assumption discharged by an instance of the rule´ ½µ, then we are done by induction as the major premiss belongs to a branch of order less than Ô. If the major premiss of the instance of µ in question is an assumption discharged by an instance of the rule´ ½µ, then we are done by induction as the conclusion of this instance of´ ½µ, which has the same form as Ò , belongs to a branch of order less than Ô.
We now consider ½ . We are done if ½ is an undischarged assumption, or a relationally discharged assumption, or a relational conclusion. If ½ is the conclusion of a´Ê µ rule with zero non-relational premisses, and if ½ is not of the form , then ½ has the same form as the minimum formula which is a premiss of an introduction rule and hence quasi-subformula of Ò . If ½ is not discharged by an instance of´ ½µ, then it is discharged by an instance of´ Áµ with a conclusion that belongs to ¬ or to some branch of order less than Ô. If ½ is discharged by an instance of´ ½µ, then we have three cases. We are done if Ò ½ . If Ò ½ and ½ is the minimum formula of ¬, then ½ is a premiss of an introduction rule and hence quasi-subformula of Ò . If Ò ½ , but ½ is not the minimum formula of ¬, then ½ is either the major premiss of an instance of´ µ or a non-relational premiss of an instance of a´Ê µ rule. The first case is clear and in the second case ½ has the same form as the minimum formula which is a premiss of an introduction rule and hence quasi-subformula of Ò .
The first two exceptions in the theorem above are inherited from the standard natural deduction system for classical logic, see [19] , whereas the third one is related to the possibility of having á Ê µ rule with zero non-relational premisses.
REMARK.
If the formula occurrence is not covered by one of the three exceptions, then it is a quasi-subformula of , or of some formula in , or of a formula of the form or ¦ (since relational premisses, relational conclusions, and relationally discharged assumptions are of the form or
Note that the formulation of the theorem involves the notion of a branch in what appears to be an indispensable way. 
Natural deduction at work
We shall in this section consider a cut-free Gentzen system corresponding to our natural deduction system AE À´Çµ · Ì. Gentzen systems are like natural deduction systems characterized by having two different kinds of rules for each non-nullary connective, but whereas natural deduction rules either introduce or eliminate a connective, Gentzen rules either introduce a connective on the lefthand side of a sequent or introduce the connective on the right-hand side of a sequent. Gentzen rules for hybrid logic are given in Figures 6, 7 We now use the normalization theorem for our natural deduction system AE À´Çµ · Ì to prove a lemma which implies the completeness of À´Çµ · Ì. PROOF. We first prove that the lemma holds for the Gentzen system in . We only cover the case where is the conclusion of an elimination rule; the other cases are straightforward. Let ¬ ½ Ò be a branch in such that Ò . Since Ò is the conclusion of an elimination rule, each formula occurrence in ¬ except Ò is the major premiss of an elimination rule, cf. Lemma 5.8. Thus, the formula occurrence ½ cannot be a discharged assumption. So ½ is either an undischarged assumption, or a relational conclusion, or the conclusion af a´Ê µ rule with zero non-relational premisses. The cases where ½ is a relational conclusion or the conclusion af a´Ê µ rule with zero non-relational premisses are straightforward. If ½ is an undischarged assumption, then we split up in subcases depending on the form of ½ . Note that ½ ¾ . We only cover the subcase where ½ is of the form £ ; the other subcases are similar. So we have a derivation of ¦ from for some nominal , and moreover, we have a derivation of from . By induction we get derivations in The two statements below are equivalent.
1.
¡ is derivable in À´Çµ · Ì. 
Comparison to related work
Our natural deduction systems share several features with the hybrid-logical tableau and Gentzen systems given in [3] and the tableau system given in [5] , for example the feature that all formulas in derivations are satisfaction statements. However, since our systems are in natural deduction style, we provide a proof-theoretic analysis in the form a normalization theorem and a theorem which says that any normal derivation satisfies a version of the subformula property, namely the quasi-subformula property. On the other hand, tableau systems and cut-free or analytic Gentzen systems in general trivially satisfy the subformula property. Indeed, if the quasi-subformula property is formulated as appropriate for the tableau system given in [3] , then it is trivial to check that it has this property. A similar remark applies to the Gentzen system of [3] . Another difference between our work and [3] is that we consider additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions expressed by geometric theories whereas [3] considers tableau systems extended with axioms that are so-called pure hybrid-logical formulas, that is, formulas that contain no ordinary propositional symbols (thus, the only propositional symbols in such formulas are nominals). Note in this connection that a firstorder condition expressible by a geometric theory is not necessarily expressible by a pure formula of hybrid logic unless the binder is used.
The use of geometric theories in the context of proof-theory traces back to [25] where it was pointed out that formulas in basic geometric theories correspond to simple natural deduction rules for intuitionistic modal logic. First-order conditions expressed by geometric theories cover a very wide class of logics. This is, for example, witnessed by the fact that any so-called Geach axiom schema, that is, modal-logical axiom schema of the form ¦ £ Ñ £ Ð ¦ Ò where £ (respectively ¦ ) is an abbreviation for a sequence of occurrences of £ (respectively ¦), corresponds to a formula of the form required in a basic geometric theory. To be precise, such a Geach axiom schema corresponds to the first-order formula is then equivalent to a formula of the form required in a basic geometric theory. See [25, 2] . In the natural deduction system considered in [25] , a distinction is made between the language of ordinary modal logic and a metalanguage involving atomic first-order formulas of the form Ê´ µ together with formulas of the form where is a formula of ordinary modal logic. One contribution of the present paper is to point out that basic geometric theories correspond to natural deduction rules for hybrid logic where no such distinction between an object language and a metalanguage is made. It should be mentioned that a natural deduction system for classical modal logic which is similar to the system of [25] has been given in [2] . However, one difference is that only Horn clause theories are considered in the latter work.
The Gentzen systems we consider in this paper are somewhat similar to a Gentzen system given in [3] . One difference, however, is that in [3] a different set of rules for equality (in connection with nominals) is used.
The feature of our systems that all formulas in derivations are satisfaction statements is at a general level in line with the fundamental idea of [14, 15] which is to prefix formulas in derivations by metalinguistic indexes, or labels, with the aim of regulating the proof process. In fact, the labelled deductive systems of [15] are proposed as a systematic way of giving proof systems to many different logics. Note that the work of [25] fits naturally into this framework. It should also be mentioned that labelled deductive systems are the basis for the natural deduction systems for substructural logics given in [12] . The crucial difference between the work of [14, 15, 25, 12] and our work is that the indexes, or labels, used in the mentioned work belong to a metalanguage whereas in our systems they are part of the object language, namely the language of hybrid logic. Thus, in the the terminology of [3] , the metalanguage has been internalized in the object language.
Also the paper [23] should be mentioned here. In that paper a natural deduction system for a logic of situations similar to hybrid logic is given; the system in question is, however, quite different from ours, see [11] for a comparison. See also [24, 27] .
